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ABSTRACT
The creation of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) has been suggested in recent
years as the means for achieving the cost-efficient integration of the many
distributed energy resources (DERs) that are starting to emerge in the elec-
tricity network. In this work, we contribute to the development of VPPs by
offering a game-theoretic perspective to the problem. Specifically, we de-
sign cooperatives (or “cooperative VPPs”—CVPPs) of rational autonomous
DER-agents representing small-to-medium size renewable electricity pro-
ducers, which coalesce to profitably sell their energy to the electricity grid.
By so doing, we help to counter the fact that individual DERs are often ex-
cluded from the wholesale energy market due to their perceived inefficiency
and unreliability. We discuss the issues surrounding the emergence of such
cooperatives, and propose a pricing mechanism with certain desirable prop-
erties. Specifically, our mechanism guarantees that CVPPs have the incen-
tive to truthfully report to the grid accurate estimates of their electricity
production, and that larger rather than smaller CVPPs form; this promotes
CVPP efficiency and reliability. In addition, we propose a scheme to allo-
cate payments within the cooperative, and show that, given this scheme and
the pricing mechanism, the allocation is in the core and, as such, no subset
of members has a financial incentive to break away from the CVPP. More-
over, we develop an analytical tool for quantifying the uncertainty about
DER production estimates, and distinguishing among different types of er-
rors regarding such estimates. We then utilize this tool to devise protocols
to manage CVPP membership. Finally, we demonstrate these ideas through
a simulation that uses real-world data.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The vision of a “Smart Grid” [12], and the resulting creation of
a robust, intelligent electricity supply network which makes effi-
cient use of energy resources and reduces carbon emissions, is a
challenge that has been recently taken up by a growing number of
researchers [6, 3, 7, 14, 15]. In this context, one of the main prob-
lems facing the energy supply industry is how to best achieve the
utilization of the distributed energy resources (DERs) that, in re-
cent years, have appeared in the electricity network. Such DERs
range from electricity storage devices to small and medium capac-
ity (2kW-2MW) renewable energy generators.
In principle, employing DERs to produce energy could reduce
reliance on conventional power plants even by half [10]. Unlike
conventional power plants that lie on the transmission network and
are “dispatched” (i.e., called in to produce energy when needed)
by the national electricity transmission network operators (termed
the Grid herein), DERs lie in the distribution network and, due to
their small size, they (and their capacity) are “invisible” to the Grid.
Thus, they cannot be easily dispatched to meet demand. Moreover,
due to their decentralized nature and small size, DERs are either
invisible to the electricity market as well, or, lack the capacity, flex-
ibility or controllability to participate in a cost-efficient way [10].
Now, the reliability of supply is a major concern of the Grid. It
is essential that independent suppliers are reliable, since the failure
to meet production targets could seriously compromise the smooth
operation of the network as a whole. In contrast, given the unpre-
dictability of renewable energy sources, the DERs would usually
struggle to meet power generation targets when operating alone.
This normally prohibits them from striking profitable deals with
the Grid, and keeps them out of the electricity market for fear of
suffering penalties specified in contracts (driving them to sign low-
profit contracts with third-party market participants instead) [10].
To address this issue, in recent years many countries (e.g., in the
EU) have enacted policies that guarantee the sale of electricity from
small-scale producers to the Grid in pre-determined feed-in tariffs
that are generally above market prices. Such policies were con-
ceived by the need to promote the incorporation of renewable en-
ergy sources into the Grid, so that they generate appreciable per-
centages of total demand. However, with the number of DERs
expected to rise to hundreds of thousands, and with the variable
generation seen as another uncertainty to be addressed in real time
through active Grid management, this is clearly unsustainable.
To counter these problems, the creation of Virtual Power Plants
(VPPs) to aggregate DERs into the virtual equivalent of a large
power station, and thus enable them to cost-efficiently integrate into
the market, has been proposed in recent years. [7, 10]. A VPP is
a broad term that intuitively represents the aggregated capabilities
of a set of DERs. For example, it can be thought of as a portfolio
of DERs, as an independent entity or agent that coordinates DERs
pooling their resources together, or as an external aggregator that
“hires” DERs to profit from their exploitation.
In our work here, we propose that power-producing DERs co-
alesce together to form cooperatives of agents that can profitably
be integrated into the Grid, such a cooperative corresponding to
a virtual power plant. Viewing the DERs as autonomous agents
is natural, due to their distributed nature and inherent individual
rationality, and enables them to realize their full potential as self-
interested market units (as it allows for the possibility that even the
smallest of DERs can carry out certain communication and intelli-
gent decision making tasks on their own, but without imposing this
as a requirement). We call these coalitions of DER-agents “coop-
eratives” because of (a) their completely decentralized nature; (b)
their ability to sell their production without relying on any exter-
nal entity that profits by using their members’ resources; and (c)
the fact that members willingly participate in a coalition, as it is in
their best interests to do so. Of course, the mechanisms described
in this work can also be readily used by any company that wishes to
attract DERs as suppliers, aiming to resell their energy to the Grid.
In the rest of the paper, we will use the terms “cooperative” and
“cooperative VPP (CVPP)” interchangeably.
Given the issues discussed above, it is only natural that the Grid
should encourage the emergence of cooperatives, by guaranteeing
the purchase of CVPP energy at competitive rates. To this end, in
this paper we incorporate ideas from mechanism design and coop-
erative game theory, and put forward an energy pricing mechanism
to be employed by the Grid. The mechanism can be seen as an
efficient alternative to feed-in tariffs, and so promotes the incorpo-
ration of the DERs (as CVPPs) in the Grid. In some detail, our
mechanism promotes supply reliability, guaranteeing that CVPPs
truthfully provide the Grid with estimates of their electricity pro-
duction that are as accurate as possible. Further, they are rewarded
for increased production, while the Grid maintains the ability to
decide the flexibility of the mechanism and its degree of indepen-
dence from market fluctuations. Building on that key contribution,
we then propose a payment scheme to allocate payments within
the cooperative, and show that, given this scheme and the pricing
mechanism, a CVPP can guarantee payments to its members such
that no subset of them has a financial incentive to form a CVPP
of its own. Formally, we guarantee that, provided DER production
estimates are accurate, the payments to CVPP members lie in the
set of core allocations of the corresponding coalitional game [9].
We then develop a method that quantifies the uncertainty regard-
ing DER production estimates and distinguishes between different
types of errors in predicted production (i.e., those specific to indi-
vidual DERs, and those common within whole DER clusters), and
employ it to devise CVPP membership management protocols.
This is the first paper to discuss the formation of VPPs from a
game-theoretic standpoint, extrapolating as it does mechanism de-
sign and cooperative game theory concepts and techniques to this
domain. As such, this work demonstrates that multiagent research
can provide the energy industry with solutions regarding the suc-
cessful integration of DERs in the supply network. Note that this
research has the potential of short to mid-term applicability in re-
alistic settings, as several power trading companies that buy elec-
tricity from small scale producers to sell to the Grid already exist.
Examples include Flexitricity in the UK and Tata Power Trading
Company Ltd. in India (business description available online).
2. RELATED WORK
Here we briefly review existing related work that provides intelli-
gent agents—and, more generally, AI research—solutions to energy-
related problems. To begin, we note that researchers in the com-
munity have recently presented economics-inspired work to tackle
such problems. Specifically, Vytelingum et al. [15] proposed strate-
gies for the management of distributed micro-storage energy de-
vices that adapt to the electricity market conditions. In separate
work, they developed a market-based mechanism to automatically
manage the congestion within the system by pricing the flow of
electricity, and proposed strategies for traders in the Smart Grid [14].
However, ideas from cooperative game theory in particular—
i.e., from the branch of game theory that studies the problem of
forming coalitions of cooperating agents—have been used in the
broader energy domain for more than a decade. Yeung et al. [16]
employ coalitional game theory in a multiagent system model of
the trading process between market entities that generate, transmit
and distribute power. Also, Contreras et al. [2, 1] presented a bilat-
eral Shapley value negotiation scheme to determine how to share
the costs for the expansion of power transmission networks among
coalescing rational agents.
Turning our attention to VPP-specific literature, Pudjianto et al.
[10] stress the need to integrate DERs into the electricity network
in an organized and controllable manner through participation in a
VPP structure, and discuss the subsequent technical and commer-
cial benefits to the electricity network as a whole. They also clearly
outline the economic advantages to DERs, demonstrating as they
do through specific examples that VPPs can be used to facilitate
DER access to the electricity market. Dimeas and Hatziargyriou [6]
also call for the emergence of VPPs, and essentially suggest an or-
ganizational structure that makes use of interacting coalitions to
this purpose. Similarly, Mihailescu et al. [8] propose the use of
coalition formation to build VPPs, but do not provide the details of
the formation process or offer specific game-theoretic solutions—
as they do not discuss issues of individual rationality or incentive
compatibility. Though all of those papers advocate the creation of
VPPs, they do not describe specific mechanisms for the market-
VPP interface or the interactions among VPP members.
In contrast, the PowerMatcher (see [7] for an overview) is a de-
centralized system architecture that has been proposed as a means
to balance demand and supply in clusters of DERs. It attempts to
implement optimal supply and demand matching by organizing the
DER-agents into a logical tree, assigning them roles and prescrib-
ing strategies to use in their interactions. The aspect of this system
most relevant to us is the one proposing the aggregation of individ-
ual agents’ supply offers in a cluster, serving as a VPP through the
use of an objective agent. Such an agent has the task of implement-
ing a “business logic” that would guide the VPP’s actions. How-
ever, the authors stop short of proposing a specific business logic.
Our approach can be seen as a detailed description of just such a
logic, employing game-theoretic ideas and tools to this purpose.
3. AGENT COOPERATIVES
An agent cooperative (CVPP) is a collection of participating DER
agents, each of which registers with the CVPP when joining. The
CVPP may possess and employ any rules, tools and functionality
necessary to ensure its unconstrained and profitable operation as an
enterprise. We now present briefly some key CVPP characteristics
and functionality most relevant to our work here.
In most countries, the day is divided into 48 half-hour electricity
trading intervals, or settlement periods. For each of these, electric-
ity prices are set in the market, and specific electricity production
targets are specified for the various generators the day before, given
predicted supply and demand. A DER i can estimate an expected
production value p˜rodi,tj for any half-hour period tj . This is the
energy it expects to be able to supply during tj , given any known
external factors (such as the prevailing meteorological conditions)
and its expected technical state. Thus, the main profile parameter
that describes the production of a DER i throughout each day is
its expected production vector p˜rodi = 〈p˜rodi,tj 〉, describing the
DER’s production for every half-hour period.
Note that, besides this estimated production, there is an actual
production vector associated with each DER i: prodi = 〈prodi,tj 〉.
The value for each prodi,tj , however, becomes known only after
the corresponding period elapses. We will be using the simplified
notation prodi and p˜rodi to refer to i’s production when the pe-
riod tj of reference is evident or of no significance. Furthermore,
we will be using prodC and p˜rodC to denote the production and
expected production of a cooperative C of DER agents. The differ-
ence between the tj-values of the estimated and actual production
vectors, gives the DER (or, similarly, CVPP) prediction error for
the tj period. Note that prodC =
P
i prodi, as the total CVPP
production is just the sum of the production of its DERs. Further,
we assume that p˜rodC =
P
i p˜rodi.
1
Now, essential functionality for the CVPP operation includes
rules and procedures for (a) the distribution of revenues, (b) the ag-
gregation of individual production estimates into CVPP-wide ones,
and (c) membership management (admitting and expelling mem-
bers). That functionality might be located on some central agent
responsible for “running” the CVPP, or it could be potentially dis-
tributed over several agents. The functionality localization details
are unimportant to our work here. Instead, we proceed to describe
the aforementioned CVPP operational activities in depth.
4. TRUTHFUL AND RELIABLE CVPPS
In this section, we present a payment mechanism that can be em-
ployed by the Grid to promote the formation of DER cooperatives.
The mechanism addresses the main hurdles the Grid faces with re-
spect to DERs’ integration—namely, the unreliability of their pro-
duction (given DERs’ dependance on uncontrollable factors, like
the weather), and their large numbers (given that it is anticipated
that hundreds of thousands of DERs would be eventually embed-
ded within a given country’s distribution network).
To begin, we elucidate the main requirements of the Grid with
respect to its interaction with CVPPs, and proceed to show how
they translate into the features of our payment mechanism.
(a) Reliability of supply: The Grid operators are responsible for
compiling production schedules to pass to the large power plants.
Currently, these are based on the predicted demand for electricity.
As more supply originates from smaller generators, their predicted
output will also need to be incorporated into the Grid production
scheduling process. Hence, the Grid requires any entity interact-
ing with it (such as a DER or a CVPP) to provide it with reliable
production estimates, and to be able to honour any agreement to
supply a specific amount. Subsequently, the Grid would be willing
to reward producers that are proven to be reliable suppliers.
(b) Need to minimize the number of entities the Grid interacts
with: As already mentioned, widespread small-scale production
will result in a huge number of DERs being connected to the Grid.
However, the Grid would obviously prefer to interact with a small
number of electricity producers, as this makes it easier to manage
and settle accounts. This requirement mirrors the scenario on the
1It is conceivable that CVPP-wide estimates do not necessarily
equal
P
i p˜rodi. This would have no impact in our results.
consumption side, where the Grid interacts with only a few large
utility companies, which, in turn, interact with the millions of in-
dividual consumers. Thus, it is imperative for the Grid to promote
the formation of large CVPPs, each with a sizeable production ca-
pacity. Larger CVPPs make it possible for the Grid to interact with
a smaller number of entities, and also promote supply reliability.
4.1 Payment Mechanism
With this list of requirements in mind, we now put forward a pric-
ing mechanism that the Grid can use when making payments to the
CVPPs for their contributed energy. As discussed, the CVPPs pro-
vide their estimated production for each day-ahead settlement pe-
riod to the Grid authority. As stated above, p˜rodC is the estimated
production declared by CVPP C, and prodC its actual production
in the given time interval. Let price be the electricity base price
(per kWh). The “Grid-to-CVPP” payment from the Grid G to C is:
VG,C =
1
1 + α|p˜rodC − prodC |
β
· log(prodC) · price · prodC
(1)
The three first factors of this payment function (or pricing mech-
anism) represent the actual price being offered by the Grid to C.
Multiplying them with the actual CVPP production (the fourth fac-
tor, prodC ) gives the actual payment to C. The mechanism has
specific properties that satisfy the requirements mentioned above:
(1) The first factor, 1
1+α|p˜rodC−prodC |
β
, depends on the accu-
racy of the estimates provided by the CVPP. This accuracy fac-
tor is a bell-shaped function of p˜rodC given the actual production
prodC parameter, as the one whose graph is depicted in Fig. 1. It
simplifies to 1 when prodC = p˜rodC , proportionally decreases as
the difference between them increases. Importantly, this decrease is
independent of whether prodC is greater than p˜rodC or vice versa.
Parameters α and β are functions of prodC and determine the exact
shape of the curve, and can be tuned so that the factor approaches
zero for p˜rodC estimates that are at a distance of prodC away from
the actual prodC production. The use of this factor guarantees that
the CVPP has the incentive to truthfully provide a highly accurate
estimate of its production, as acting otherwise leads to a loss of
revenue (at least in expectation).
(2) The second factor, log(prodC), increases with production
and thus encourages a large CVPP size. Therefore, CVPPs with
more DER members generate more energy and obtain a better over-
all price than smaller ones. Nevertheless, being a log function, the
factor flattens eventually at very high production amounts. This
means that, though the formation of large CVPPs is encouraged,
the emergence of a single CVPP containing all DERs is not a neces-
sary consequence. Even though small CVPPs have an incentive to
merge initially, they will not merge ad infinitum, as there is no visi-
ble benefit after some point due to the limit linearity of the function.
Of course, other reasons to prevent merging, such as geographical
or technical restrictions, might exist.
(3) The third factor, price, is determined by the Grid either through
supply and demand in the electricity market or through other means,
and will be the same for all CVPPs participating in the market.
It is evident that this pricing mechanism promotes cooperative
participation in the market, and captures the aforementioned list of
requirements. First, it promotes supply reliability, by guarantee-
ing that CVPPs receive higher revenues for accurate estimates. A
CVPP has an incentive to provide as accurate an estimate as pos-
sible, and has no incentive to strategize about it, as the estimate is
only used by the function to check how far off the actual produc-
tion was from the promised supply target. As shown above, wilfully
providing a wrong or biased estimate does not improve and mostly
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Figure 1: An accuracy factor function diagram
decreases the payment to the CVPP for the same amount of actual
production. Thus, the mechanism promotes truthfulness on behalf
of the CVPPs. Similarly, the mechanism also promotes efficiency at
the Grid level by incentivizing the formation of large cooperatives,
each attaining a substantial production aggregate.
4.2 Truthful and Reliable DER-Agents
The above mechanism incentivises the CVPP to provide accurate
estimates about its production. As discussed earlier, the produc-
tion of a CVPP is nothing but the aggregate of the production of
all the DERs composing it. Therefore, the CVPP requires accurate
estimates of production from the DERs in order to be able to calcu-
late the production estimate to provide to the Grid. Given this, the
payment from the CVPP to the DERs should encourage the DERs
to truthfully provide good estimates of their production. Evidently,
this mirrors the scenario between the Grid and the CVPP. Taking
cue from that, we use the same principle for this “CVPP-to-DER”
payment function as the Grid-to-CVPP one. Thus, the payment
from CVPP C to member i for supplied energy prodi is:
VC,i =
z
1 + α|p˜rodi − prodi|
β
·
prodi
prodC
· VG,C (2)
We now describe the function in detail, demonstrating how it elicits
truthful and as accurate as possible predictions from the DERs.
(1) As in Eq. 1, the first factor, z
1+α|p˜rodi−prodi|
β
, is an accuracy
factor, encouraging the DER to provide the CVPP with its best pos-
sible production estimate. It equals z if the estimate was accurate,
and drops following a bell curve otherwise. Notice that z is simply
a normalization factor used to redistribute the entire VG,C amount
back to the members. Redistribution is in proportion to the mem-
bers’ production and prediction accuracy—this can be easily seen
with z = prodCP
i prodi/(1+α|p˜rodi−prodi|
β)
. Alternatively, the CVPP
can set z = 1 and use the residual profits to pay for maintenance
costs, recruiting new members, or other such purposes.
(2) The second factor, prodi
prodC
, gives the proportion of energy con-
tributed by this DER w.r.t. the total CVPP production, making the
payment distribution fair across all DERs.
(3) The last factor, VG,C , denotes the total amount that is to be
divided among the constituent DERs, and corresponds to the pay-
ment received by the CVPP from the Grid.2
To recap, by employing this payment function the CVPP pro-
motes truthful and highly accurate predictions from its constituent
DERs. A DER has an interest to truthfully and accurately report,
2Of course, this could be reduced by subtracting an amount if this
is required to account for CVPP fees or maintenance costs.
since otherwise it does not receive the full payment corresponding
to the energy it actually produced.
4.3 Payment Schemes Render Stable CVPPs
Here we provide a further, game-theoretic justification for the pay-
ment scheme used by the Grid to reward CVPPs, and for that used
by a CVPP to reward its members. Specifically, we show that, given
the functions used to reward the cooperatives and the members pay-
ment scheme described above, and assuming that all CVPP mem-
bers’ stated production estimates are accurate, no members’ subset
has an incentive to break away and form a smaller cooperative. In
addition, this result promotes the goal of large CVPP sizes.
To demonstrate this, we employ the concept of the core [9], the
strongest of the game-theoretic solution concepts used to describe
coalitional stability. Some preliminaries from cooperative game
theory are in order. To begin, let N , |N | = n, represent a set of
players; a coalition is a subset S ⊆ N . Then, a (transferable utility)
coalitional game G(N ; v) is defined by its characteristic function
v : 2N 7→ R that specifies the value v(S) of each coalition S [13].
Intuitively, v(S) represents the maximal payoff the members of S
can jointly receive by cooperating, and the agents can distribute
this payoff among themselves in any way. While the characteristic
function describes the payoffs available to coalitions, it does not
prescribe a way of distributing these payoffs. An allocation is a
vector of payoffs x = (x1, . . . , xn) assigning some payoff to each
i ∈ N . Then, the core is the set of x payoff allocations with the
property that no coalition of agents can guarantee all of its members
a payoff higher to what they currently receive under x. As such, no
coalition would ever be motivated to break away from the grand
coalition of all agents. Now, let x(S) denote the payoff allocated
by x to agents S ⊆ N , i.e., x(S) =
P
i∈S xi. Then, formally,
DEFINITION 1. An allocation x is in the core of G(N ; v) iff
x(N) = v(N) and for any S ⊆ N we have x(S) ≥ v(S).
That is, the value v(N) of the grand coalition is efficiently dis-
tibuted by x among all agents, and the payments specified by x are
such that any S already receives at least its value v(S). The core of
a game can be non-empty. Worse than that, it is in general NP-hard
to determine the non-emptiness of the core (see, for example, [5]).
Returning to our setting, consider the formation of a CVPP as
a coalitional game, with the characteristic function describing the
value that any subset of DERs can derive by working together as
a team, and the CVPP intuitively corresponding to the grand coali-
tion of all agents. In our case, interestingly, assuming truthful and
accurate DER estimates, the form of the characteristic function,
v(S) = log(prodS)·price·prodS , allows us to prove that the pay-
ments allocated by Eq. 2 constitute a core-stable allocation, which
also implies that the core of the game is always non-empty.
THEOREM 1. Let C = {1, . . . , n} be a cooperative of |C| = n
agents, and let G(C; v) be the coalitional game with characteristic
function v(S) = log(prodS) ·prodS ·price determining the value
of each subset S ⊆ C of agents. Consider the payoff allocation x
where each agent i in C is paid according to Eq. 2—i.e., propor-
tionally to i’s contribution to the production of the CVPP (given
p˜rodi = prodi). Then, x ∈ core(G).
PROOF. We will show that x is in the core. We know that x
distributes all payoff to the agents efficiently and therefore x(C) =
v(C), where v(C) = VG,C , so the first condition of Def. 1 holds.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that x is not in the core.
Then, there exists some S ⊆ C s.t. v(S) > x(S). But x(S) =
P
i∈S xi =
prodS
prodC
v(C) (this is easy to see by setting p˜rodi =
prodi for all i in Eq. 2). Thus: v(S) > prodSprodC ·prodC ·log(prodC)·
price⇔ prodS ·log(prodS)·price >
prodS
prodC
·prodC ·log(prodC)·
price ⇔ log(prodS) > log(prodC). But, since S ⊆ C, this is
impossible. Thus, x is in the core of G(C; v).
Thus, the choice of the Grid-to-CVPP and CVPP-to-DER payment
schemes described above is well justified from a game-theoretic,
coalitional stability point of view also.
5. QUANTIFYING PREDICTION ERRORS
In Section 4.1 we introduced the payment function of CVPPs to
their members, based partially on the accuracy of their predictions.
Here we propose several methods for quantifying the uncertainty
in DER predictions, and distinguishing between different types of
prediction errors. This will prove helpful for devising methods to
handle CVPP membership (in Section 6). To begin, consider the
examples of a virtual power plant that aggregates the supply from
several DER wind farms (belonging to different stakeholders) dis-
tributed in a geographical area, or from a set of solar panels in-
stalled by different houses in an extended neighbourhood. Each
DER can make an error in the prediction of its future output for a
given half-hour period. It is useful to distinguish between two main
classes of errors:
(a) Systematic errors: This error type is caused by the inherent
uncertainty in predicting an outside variable that is used as an input
by several DERs while calculating their production estimates. For
renewables, this is most likely a weather-related variable, such as
wind speed or solar power. So, for example, if the meteorological
office is innacurate in its prediction of wind speed at a certain time
in a local area, then all the wind turbines in that area may register
an error in their predicted production. We call this type of error
systematic, as it is common to all energy resources that rely on that
factor, and it is outside the control of individual DERs.
(b) Residual errors (DER specific): Besides the systematic er-
rors, the predictions of an individual DER may be affected by er-
rors caused by factors specific to itself, and (at least partially) under
its control. In the example discussed above, even if a wind turbine
is supplied with very accurate predictions of wind speed, its predic-
tion of its actual output may not be that accurate (because it is an
older turbine, requires maintenance work, and so on).
Against this background, we now propose a statistical method
for distinguishing between the different types of prediction errors.
Consider a dataset consisting of m DERs in a CVPP, which belong
to the same category of energy producers (e.g., wind turbines from
the same area). For each of these DERs, n half-hour data points are
available within some large time period T = {1, . . . , n} (n can be
quite large as the data can span several days, weeks or months).
Formally, let p˜rodi,t and prodi,t denote the estimated and actual
production of DER i in a half-hour interval t. Moreover, let ∆i,t =
prodi,t − p˜rodi,t, ∀i = {1, . . . ,m},∀t ∈ T denote i’s prediction
errors in t. Given the 2-dimensional error matrix with entries ∆i,t
as defined above, we can define the average prediction error across
all DERs for some t ∈ T as: µ∆t =
Pm
i=1∆i,t
m
.
In what follows, we denote by ∆iT the n-vector of errors corre-
sponding to energy producer i for every interval t ∈ T (∆iT is a
row of ∆i,t error matrix entries corresponding to i), and by µ∆T the
n-vector containing the average prediction errors across all DERs
for all time steps t ∈ T . We can now compute the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient ρ∆i between vectors ∆iT and µ∆T as:
ρ
∆
i =
cov(∆iT ,µ
∆
T )
σ(∆iT )σ(µ
∆
T )
=
Pn
i=1(∆i,t −∆i)(µ
∆
t − µ
∆
t )qPn
i=1(∆i,t −∆i)
2
qPn
i=1(µ
∆
t − µ
∆
t )
2
(3)
where cov(∆iT ,µ∆T ) denotes the statistical covariance between
the two vectors ∆iT and µ∆T , σ(∆iT ) and σ(µ∆T ) are their standard
deviations, and ∆i =
Pn
t=1∆i,t
n
and µ∆t =
Pn
t=1 µ
∆
t
n
their means.
Intuitively, for each energy producer i, ρ∆i ∈ [0, 1] shows how
correlated its errors in predicted production were with the average
errors made by the energy producers in the same category in the
CVPP. In our wind turbine example, if the coefficient ρ∆i for wind
tubine i is high, it means that this turbine tends to make a prediction
error when all other wind turbines in its area make a prediction error
of similar proportions. Thus, its error is mostly of a “systematic”
nature. If there is an uncertain, outside factor (e.g., wind speed
prediction) causing an error for all these turbines, then the errors
can be assigned to this factor. Conversely, if ρ∆i is low, the errors
of this wind turbine are caused by its own functioning/prediction
capabilities, and appear unrelated to those of similar producers.
With this at hand, statistical theory [4] allows us to define two
important measures for the error vector of each producer i: the
fraction of variance explained by the systematic factor (also called
the coefficient of determination), FVE∆i = (ρ∆i )2, and the frac-
tion of variance unexplained (or, the fraction of residual variance)
FVU
∆
i = 1 − (ρ
∆
i )
2
. In essence, these measures determine the
percentage of the variance in DER i’s prediction errors that can be
explained by systematic factors. Thus, we can separate the vari-
ance σ(∆iT ) in the prediction errors of each i over period T into
the systematic and the residual variance, the latter defined as:
σres(∆
i
T ) = FVU
∆
i σ(∆
i
T ) = [1− (ρ
∆
i )
2]σ(∆iT ) (4)
Thus, the residual variance provides us with a tool to determine
whether the prediction error of a specific DER i is due to factors
that do not affect other energy producers of the same nature and
in the same area. As we shall see, this tool can be used to inform
CVPP membership management decisions.
6. MANAGING CVPP MEMBERSHIP
In Section 4.3 we showed that, given the payment function de-
scribed in Eq. 1, coalitions representing CVPPs are stable, in the
sense that DERs do not have a financial incentive to abandon them.
However, this result only holds when the DERs composing the
coalition are always able to provide accurate, error-free estimates
of their production. In general, cooperatives do not have an incen-
tive to expel members, given that more members means greater ex-
pected production and thus greater expected revenues. At the same
time, given Eq. 1, it is also true that, if certain DER members are
consistently unreliable in their production estimates, then the addi-
tional penalty that the CVPP suffers due to increased unreliability
can in the long term offset any benefits from an increased overall
production. Therefore, a CVPP should perform a regular evaluation
of its individual members’ performance, based on which it may de-
cide to expel some of them. In this section, we provide methods for
such an evaluation.
Formally, as in Section 5 above, we consider the performance of
m DERs belonging to a CVPP in a discretized time period T con-
sisting of t = 1, . . . , n half-hour periods. Furthermore, we denote
by C\i the CVPP C if DER i was not its member. Given the Grid-
to-CVPP payment of Eq. 1, we define the marginal contribution
(or marginal value) of DER i to cooperative C in period t to be:
V
mg
i→C;t = VG,C;t − VG,C\i;t (5)
Intuitively, the marginal contribution of DER i to the cooperative at
any time interval is the difference between the payment that a co-
operative actually receives, and the payment it would have received
had i not been part of the cooperative.3 Note that this marginal
3Incidentally, although perhaps intuitively appealing, using the
value is influenced by both the estimated and actual productions,
p˜rodi,t and prodi,t, of DER i (and, implicitly, by its errors ∆i,t).
Given this, we now propose a method to assess the long-term
performance of i within a time frame of interest T . The same
mechanism could be applied to the process of deciding whether
to accept a new member in the CVPP, if historical data regarding
its predictions’ reliability were available.
Note that a first, simple solution would be to assess the members’
performance by ranking them according to their marginal contribu-
tion during a time period T consisting of intervals t = 1, . . . , n.
That is, we can simply add the marginal contributions of DER i for
the intervals t ∈ T : V mgi→C;T =
P
t=1,...,n V
mg
i→C;t. Then, each
producer can be ranked by its marginal contribution to the revenues
of the CVPP, as described by V mgi→C;T across the period T of inter-
est. This method captures the exact contributions of members, but
does not account for systematic errors. So, for example, a DER sit-
uated in an area with poor wind/solar power prediction for a given
period, would be penalized for elements outside its control.
A fairer method would be to use the residual variance specific to
each DER. Such a method involves ranking the producers accord-
ing to their residual variances, as computed in Eq. 4, over a period
T . The least accurate producers could then possibly be expelled
from the CVPP, as a high residual variance shows their prediction
accuracy underperforms that of others in the same area for a consid-
erable period of time. However, that would have the disadvantage
that it completely disregards the contributions of individual DERs
to the CVPP revenues. Indeed, a CVPP could be reluctant to ex-
pel a member that, though consistently inaccurate, still contributes
significantly to the CVPP production and, therefore, revenues.
Thus, here we propose a method that actually weighs the marginal
contribution of a DER by its residual variance (normalized to [0, 1]
through division by the sum of residual variances across all m
agents). Specifically, C calculates, for each i over T , the following:
scoreiT = (1−
σres(∆
i
T )
Pm
j=1 σres(∆
j
T )
)V mgi→C;T (6)
Intuitively, DERs with higher residual variance have their marginal
contribution disregarded more, while still taking some credit for it.
The CVPP then ranks the DERs in terms of their score, and has the
option to expel members with low performance. The advantage of
this method is that it avoids punishing individual DERs for system-
atic errors, while taking into account their marginal contributions
at the same time.
7. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We tested our payment mechanisms by examining the incentives
of a set of individual DERs to form a cooperative, in the context
of a renewables generation scenario. The data used in our anal-
ysis comes from the Sotavento experimental wind farm, in Gali-
cia, Spain, and is made freely available for research purposes from
their website (http://www.sotaventogalicia.com/). The farm pro-
duces roughly the energy required to serve 12,000 homes. In what
follows, we first discuss how we constructed individual wind tur-
bine profiles from the available data, and describe our prediction
marginal contributions to distribute the CVPP revenues to the
DERs is problematic as an approach, because it compromises DER
truthfulness. Specifically, it provides agents with a reason to strate-
gize and base their reports on those of others, since their payment
would be based on whether they can accurately predict and “cor-
rect” the reports of others, so that they are awarded the marginal
gains resulting from improved CVPP performance. Though the
study of such collective “auto-correction” mechanisms is perhaps
interesting, it is out of the scope of this work.
scenarios. We then apply our mechanisms to this setting, demon-
strate the benefits to individual turbines from forming a coopera-
tive, and evaluate our method for ranking DERs according to pre-
diction performance.
To begin, the main characteristic of a wind turbine is its power
curve, describing, for a given level of wind speed, its electrical out-
put (in MW). The generic power curve of wind turbines is typically
a sigmoid function, with a threshold level, beyond which the power
output increases more sharply. A turbine’s nominal capacity de-
scribes its maximum power (and, subsequently, energy produced
per hour) output for “optimal” wind speed.
The Sotavento farm contains 24 wind turbines, with an installed
nominal capacity of 17.5 MW which jointly produce an average
of 38,500 MWh yearly. The available dataset we used in our ex-
periments contains, for each hourly slot for the entire year from 2
September 2009 to 2 September 2010, both the actual wind speeds
recorded, as well as the farm production (in kWh) for that time
slot. There are 8600 records/year provided in total, due to some
records being corrupt. Fig. 2 shows a scatter plot of all the yearly
data points from Sotavento, as well as the power curve (the sigmoid
function) we derived based on this data.
Next, we divided the derived curve for the entire farm (i.e., in
our terminology, the CVPP) into 24 identical power curves, one for
each individual wind turbine (DER). Note that, while no detailed
data was available about individual turbines, considering them equal
in nominal production capacity is realistic, and sufficient to illus-
trate the functioning of our model. Therefore, based on the real
data, each of the 24 turbines has a nominal capacity of ∼700 kW
(or, it can supply∼500 homes). Ifwt is the wind speed at an hourly
timepoint t (in m/s), the generic power curve of each turbine is:
prod
generic
i,t (wt) =
700
1 + e0.66∗(9−wt)
(7)
The shape of this function for each individual turbine is the same
as that in Fig. 2, but with a maximal capacity of 700 kW.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of the yearly data points from Sotavento.
7.1 Forming CVPPs of Wind Turbines
Although the Sotavento site provides real data about production
and wind speeds, it does not provide us with any long-term data
about the predictions of individual turbines. Furthermore, all wind
turbines in Sotavento are owned by the same entity (a government
agency). By contrast, our goal is to examine more decentralized
settings, with these turbines belonging to individual stakeholders.
Specifically, our aim here is to verify experimentally that, given
our payment mechanisms, “self-interested” turbines (DERs) with
different abilities have an incentive to coalesce into a CVPP.
To this end, we consider experimental scenarios in which the
main parameter varied is the prediction ability of individual tur-
bines regarding future production. Formally, given a wind speed
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Figure 3: Benefits from joining a CVPP vs. selling to the Grid as an independent producer (singleton): (a) symmetric case; (b)
asymmetric case: performance of good predictors; and (c) asymmetric case: performance of poor predictors. Averages are over
86,000 steps (8600 hourly time points available in a year & yearly simulation run 10 times). Error bars too small to be visible.
prediction wt, we first compute a generic (idealized) production
prod
generic
i,t of each wind turbine i at time t using Eq. 7.
4 Then,
the actual production for each DER i = 1 . . . 24 is given by
prodi,t = prod
generic
i,t · N (1, σsyst)
where the variance factor σsyst captures the systematic error that
is common to all turbines (i.e., the actual wind speed is not the
same as predicted). While the actual productions are drawn inde-
pendently for each DER i, the deviation σsyst of the normal pertur-
bation distribution is the same for all, reflecting the fact that they
are all subject to the same uncertain, outside factor (wind speed).
Now, the DERs can have rather different capabilities w.r.t. deriv-
ing future production estimates. This is captured by a DER-specific
(or residual) error factor σires. Then, the estimated production re-
ported by each DER i = 1 . . . 24 is:
p˜rodi,t = prod
generic
i,t · N (1, σ
i
res)
Against this background, we use two simulation settings to ex-
plore the benefits to individual DERs from being in a CVPP. In both
settings, the number of DERs is fixed at 24 (as in Sotavento), each
with generic production functions as in Eq. 7, and with the system-
atic error variance set to σsyst = 0.1. We set price = 0.05; this is
combined with the first two factors of Eq. 1 to give the actual price
in euros/kWh. We consider the following cases:
(a) The symmetric case: All DER-agents are equally good or
equally bad in predicting their own production. In other words, the
residual deviation σires is the same accross all agents i.
(b) The asymmetric case: The agents in the cooperative are di-
vided into 2 classes: one of good predictors, having a low residual
deviation σres(low) = 0.05 regarding their production estimates,
and a second class of poor predictors, having a high residual devi-
ation of σres(high) = 0.6. The relative proportion of the two class
sizes varies from 0/24 to 24/24 (out of the 24 agents in the CVPP).
For both scenarios, we ran a series of experiments where the
real wind data for all hourly intervals for an entire year was used.
The simulation of the hourly wind speeds over the entire year was
repeated 10 times5 to reduce the outcomes’ variance, resulting to
86, 000 tests for each data point shown in the results of Fig. 3.
4As already discussed, our simulation uses the real wind speeds for
each hour for the 365 days in the year.
5The simulation parameters were chosen with the computational
requirements of the various experimental settings in mind, but in
all cases our results are statistically significant.
Joining a CVPP is beneficial in the symmetric case.
Turning our attention to Fig. 3(a) which depicts the results for the
symmetric predictions scenario, we can see that, whatever the resid-
ual uncertainty in prediction is, individual DERs have an incentive
to join together to form a CVPP. For small values of the deviation
in prediction error σires (i.e., when all agents predictions are almost
entirely accurate), this effect is due to the superadditive structure
of the reward function of Eq. 1. This was not surprising, given
the result of Theorem 1. Interestingly, however, the impact of our
payment schemes is even more profound when highly inaccurate
DERs (i.e., those with high values of residual variance) are con-
sidered. In this case, the revenue for singleton DERs more than
halves when compared to their average gains when participating in
a CVPP (from 1700 to 800 euro/day), as the agents are punished by
the Grid for their inability to predict their production accurately.
As expected, when agents interact with the Grid as a CVPP, the
cooperative’s revenue also drops when its members become less
accurate in prediction. However, the drop is much smaller, from
2700 to about 2600 euro/day for each of the 24 members. This
is mainly because, if added over the entire cooperative, residual
prediction errors cancel each other. Thus, quite interestingly, even
a virtual power plant consisting of 24 DERs with poor prediction
ability is able to issue a reasonably accurate estimate to the Grid.
Results for the asymmetric case.
We now examine a setting in which DERs can be separated into
two distinct classes, one of good and one of poor predictors (with
a residual variance of σres(low) = 0.05 and σres(high) = 0.6 re-
spectively). The main experimental parameter varied here is the
number of agents of each type that make up the CVPP; these are
varied from 0 to 24.
Simulation results appear in Fig. 3(b) and 3(c). We observe that,
in general, both types are better off being in a CVPP than interact-
ing with the Grid as singletons. This is regardless of whether the
other participants are good predictors or poor. However, there are
some additional interesting observations to be made in this setting.
Somewhat surprisingly, good predictors actually do much bet-
ter if the rest of the cooperative members are poor. The reason for
this is the way the CVPP-to-DER payment redistribution function
works. If an agent is the only accurate one (or among the few accu-
rate ones) in the cooperative, it gets a large proportion of the joint
payments, as it is among the few with a low error factor, and thus
enjoys high returns following the (normalized to reward accuracy,
as explained in Section 4.2) redistribution of CVPP’s revenues.
In general, poor predictors also have a strong incentive to join
the CVPP, as the results in Fig. 3(c) show. An interesting point
to note is that it would appear from these results that both poor
and good predictors prefer the other agents in the cooperative to be
poor predictors (unless their errors are all biased towards the same
direction and thus do not cancel out—an improbable scenario for
large CVPPs). However, as shown in our figures, a random member
of the cooperative would on average expect to do slightly better if
the number of good predictors is high, as the cooperative as a whole
gains more revenue on average in that case.
7.2 Ranking DERs by Prediction Performance
For the last set of results, we use a similar setting as the asym-
metric case described above. We divide the DER-agents into two
categories: good predictors (with σres(low) = 0.05) and poor pre-
dictors (with σres(high) = 0.3). The number of each agent type in
the cooperative was varied from 1 to 23 (out of 24 agents in total).
Recall that in Section 6, two methods for assessing the contribu-
tion of a DER i to the CVPP were discussed: one based on only
its marginal contribution to the cooperative, and the other taking
into account both i’s marginal contribution and the residual error
variance σres(∆iT ). In our experiments, we compare these two
methods, taking T to be one year of hourly data, as before.
The graph in Fig. 4 shows, for settings with k = 1 . . . 24 poor
predictors, the number of real poor predictors detected by each
method (i.e., how many actual poor predictors are among the k
lowest scoring agents returned by each method used). Note that
the ranking shown is actually an average over 25 runs, sufficient to
reduce the results’ variance to very low levels (since, in fact, each
data point represents the results from 25 years of real hourly data).
As we can see, the method that weighs marginal values by resid-
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Figure 4: Results for the efficiency of ranking measures.
ual variance (Eq. 6), making use of the techniques of Section 5,
is clearly better in distinguishing poor predictors than ranking by
marginal contributions alone; in fact, it rarely identifies a predictor
wrongly in this setting. In contrast, the strategy of ranking solely by
marginal values does degrade, especially when the number of good
predictors roughly equals that of poor ones. In any case, the results
in this setting show that both methods manage to distinguish poor
predictors from good ones with a very high degree of accuracy.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we applied several game-theoretic ideas in the energy
domain. We presented a pricing mechanism that can be used as an
alternative to feed-in tariffs, in order to promote the creation and
cost-efficient operation of DER cooperatives. We also proposed
a method to allocate CVPP revenues to its members, and showed
that this method promotes CVPP stability (assigning payoffs that
are core-stable, under the condition of DER accuracy). We also
showed that the payment functions incentivize truth-telling when
CVPPs interact with the Grid and when DERs interact with the
CVPP; and that our methods promote supply reliability and produc-
tion efficiency. Moreover, we provided a generic method for CVPP
membership management, which was experimentally shown to be
successful in ranking DERs w.r.t. predictions’ accuracy. Crucially,
our ideas were evaluated on scenarios using data from a real-world
wind-farm. Our results confirm that joining CVPPs which make
use of our proposed payment schemes is almost always beneficial
to any individual DER.
In future work, we intend to study alternative pricing schemes
to the one proposed here. For instance, residual errors-related in-
formation could perhaps be incorporated in the payment function.
Doing so optimally and in a fair manner is not straightforward,
since determining the residual part of the error requires the study
of an agent’s performance over an extended period, while the pay-
ment function rewards the agent for its immediate performance. We
also intend to examine alternative ways to distribute rewards among
CVPP members, perhaps by utilizing their Shapley value [9]. Al-
though its exact calculation is an intractable problem, the use of bi-
lateral Shapley value approximation schemes could be an option.
Furthermore, assuming DERs could provide production estimates
in the form of a full distribution (rather than just an expected value),
it would be interesting to devise scoring rules [11] to elicit those es-
timates, and to reward both estimates that turn out to be accurate,
and those provided with high precision (low variance). Moreover,
we would be interested in implementing a web service to accom-
modate CVPP formation and member management activities.
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